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ABSTRACT 
 
Research summary: We investigate the role of a firm’s dividend and growth reputations in 
shaping investors’ interpretations of acquisitions as a negative or positive expectation 
violation. While our findings reveal that both an acquiring firm’s dividend and growth 
reputations trigger positive investor reactions, they also show that investors react negatively 
to an acquisition of a target firm with a strong growth reputation when the acquiring firm has 
a strong dividend reputation. We also find that investors are inclined to give managers “the 
benefit of the doubt” to the extent that an acquiring firm strategically frames an acquisition 
announcement in such a way that it provides assurance to investors that the acquisition is 
meant to exceed investors’ expectations about shareholder value creation. 
 
Managerial summary: We study why investors respond to some acquisitions positively and 
others negatively. We find that the way acquiring and target firms have created shareholder 
value in the past, and the information conveyed in the acquisition announcements are 
important determinants of investors’ differential reactions to acquisitions. Our findings show 
that while investors generally react positively to acquisitions by firms known for creating 
value either through dividends or growth, their reactions become negative when a firm 
known for value creation through dividends acquires a target known for value creation 
through growth. We further find that managers can favorably influence investor reactions by 
making it salient in the acquisition announcement how the acquisition is intended to exceed 
investors’ value creation expectations from the acquiring firm. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Global acquisition activity continues to surge, and in 2019 alone firms spent 4.1 trillion US 
dollars on acquisitions (Dealogic, 2020). Although acquisitions are intended to create value, 
investors typically react negatively to acquisition announcements (Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara, Carpenter, and Davison, 2009). Drawing on the expectancy violation theory 
(EVT), Graffin and colleagues (2016) explain such reactions by investors’ interpretations of 
acquisitions as a violation of their expectations regarding how firms should behave to create 
value. Given the widespread observation that most acquisitions fail to reach their objectives 
(e.g., Haleblian et al., 2009), it is plausible that investors are skeptical about the value-
creation potential of acquisitions. However, these insights do not readily explain why 
investors evaluate some acquisitions positively (Campbell, Sirmon, and Schijven, 2016). 
Interestingly, the positive reactions of investors to acquisitions imply that they perceive 
specific acquisitions from a subset of firms to be compatible with how they expect these 
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firms to create value. However, we know little about how and under what circumstances the 
varied expectations of investors about acquiring firms influence when they perceive 
acquisitions to be a good or a bad deal. 
One key explanation for investors’ varied reactions to acquisitions is acquiring firms’ 
reputation for creating shareholder value. These reputations shape investors’ expectations of 
acquiring firms, influencing how they interpret an acquisition and react to it (Haleblian, 
Pfarrer, and Kiley, 2017). Scholars have argued that investors tend to punish high-reputation 
firms more severely for making acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2017), because acquisitions are 
not generally perceived to be conducive to value creation (Graffin, Haleblian, and Kiley, 
2016). However, firms can create shareholder value in multiple ways (Brealey, Myers, and 
Allen, 2014). Firms can thus develop distinct reputations originating from specific ways of 
creating shareholder value, which may give rise to different expectations (Mishina, Block, 
and Mannor, 2012; Parker, Krause, and Devers, 2019). Some of these expectations may 
provide firms with a greater leeway to pursue specific strategic actions, such as acquisitions, 
to fulfill investors’ expectations (e.g., Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova, 2010; Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova, and Sever, 2005; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, and Hubbard, 2016). 
Therefore, even though investors may remain largely skeptical about the value-creation 
potential of acquisitions, we suggest that they might react differently to acquisitions, 
depending on acquiring firms’ distinct reputation for creating shareholder value. By bringing 
together recent advances in research on reputation, expectancy violation theory (EVT), and 
impression management, we develop a contingency model explaining underlying reasons and 
consequences for varied expectations of investors about a firm’s acquisition behavior. In so 
doing, we extent the literature in at least two important ways. 
First, with few exceptions (e.g., Boivie, Graffin, and Gentry, 2016; Lange, Lee and Dai, 
2011; Rindova et al., 2005), prior research has conceptualized a firm’s reputation for value 
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creation along a single dimension (Haleblian et al., 2017). Moving beyond this research, our 
framework builds on the notion that a firm can develop a reputation by being known for 
distinct ways of creating value (Lange et al., 2011), and suggests that firms may create 
shareholder value either by delivering growth or by paying out dividends (Brealey et al., 
2014). Those firms that consistently deliver growth over time develop a growth reputation 
while those that consistently pay out dividends develop a dividend reputation (Parker et al., 
2019). When a firm has a growth reputation, we argue that investors will perceive that its 
acquisition behavior will enable the firm to exceed their value-creation expectations, due to 
the anticipated contribution of acquisitions to accelerate future growth. Conversely, when a 
firm has a dividend reputation, investors will perceive its acquisition behavior to be falling 
short of their expectations, because it may compromise the ability of the firm to maintain 
dividend payments. By allowing investor expectations to vary depending on acquiring firms’ 
dividend or growth reputations, our framework explains when investors will react more or 
less favorably to an acquisition announcement. Our theorizing thus demonstrates the 
underexploited application of EVT’s full spectrum of predictions, which allow acquisitions to 
be interpreted not only as negative but also as positive expectancy violations. 
Second, building on the notion that investors seek additional sources of information when 
making sense of a perceived expectancy violation (Burgoon, 1993), our framework examines 
how substantive and symbolic information cues further shape the interpretative processes of 
investors when evaluating an acquisition. Whereas substantive cues refer to information 
regarding the nature of a firm’s actions, symbolic information cues refer to firms’ use of 
impression management to convey how managers intend to fulfill stakeholders’ expectations 
(Cuypers, Koh, and Wang, 2016; Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006). Although scholars have shown 
that investors consider both types of cues when assessing expectancy violations (e.g., 
Elsbach, 1994; Gomulya and Mishina, 2017), we know very little about how substantive and 
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symbolic cues may shape investors’ interpretative processes and their subsequent reactions in 
different ways. Earlier research in this area has not only focused almost exclusively on the 
role of symbolic cues (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Graffin et al., 2016; Rhee and Fiss, 2014; 
Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, and Shapiro, 2012), it has also investigated reactions to negative 
expectancy violations in isolation. We provide a more comprehensive approach and show 
how investors’ initial perceptions of an acquisition as a negative or a positive expectancy 
violation are shaped by substantive and symbolic information cues. In so doing, we develop a 
framework which identifies important boundary conditions of EVT and offers novel insights 
about why investors’ observed reactions do not consistently follow EVT’s predictions. 
Our analysis of 462 acquisitions by 227 S&P 500 firms largely support our predictions. 
We find that an acquirer’s dividend and growth reputations both trigger favorable reactions 
from investors, yet the positive effect of firms’ growth reputation on investor reactions is 
much more precisely estimated than that of the dividend reputation. We further reveal that 
when an acquiring firm has a dividend reputation, investors react unfavorably when a firm 
with a growth reputation is targeted for acquisition. Finally, firms elicit more favorable 
reactions by framing acquisition announcements to assure investors that the acquisition is 
meant to exceed investors’ expectations about particulars ways of creating shareholder value. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Investors’ reactions to acquisitions through the lens of expectancy violation theory 
Research on acquisitions has recently focused on examining the cognitive underpinnings of 
investors’ evaluations of acquisitions through the lens of EVT (Graffin et al., 2016; Haleblian 
et al., 2017). EVT suggests that decision makers hold expectations of firms regarding how 
they should behave, and that they evaluate firms’ actions in light of these expectations 
(Burgoon, 1993). Behaviors whose consequences are anticipated to exceed expectations are 
perceived as positive expectancy violations and are rewarded, whereas those whose 
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consequences are anticipated to fall short of expectations are perceived as negative 
expectancy violations and are punished. 
Research suggests that investors mostly react negatively to acquisition announcements 
(Haleblian et al., 2009), implying that they view acquisitions as failing to meet their 
expectations for value creation (Graffin et al., 2016). Acquisitions are indeed complex 
activities with often ambiguous motives whose synergetic potential is virtually impossible to 
determine in advance (Gamache et al., 2019). Nevertheless, investors evaluate some 
acquisitions positively (Campbell et al., 2016), implying that a subset of firms are perceived 
to exceed investors’ expectations for value creation by making acquisitions. Although EVT 
may be applied to explain both unfavorable and favorable responses to organizational events, 
scholars have so far only invoked the theory to explain investors’ negative reactions to 
acquisitions. Thus, both theoretical insights and empirical evidence are limited regarding the 
specific nature of investors’ value-creation expectations, and how these may lead them to 
evaluate a given acquisition positively or negatively. 
Firm reputation and investors’ value-creation expectations 
A firm’s reputation is widely established as an important determinant of stakeholders’ 
expectations regarding a firm’s future behavior (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Zavaylova et al., 2016). 
When a firm establishes a reputation by consistently delivering a valued outcome, 
stakeholders develop expectations that this outcome will continue (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, 
Rindova, and Derfus, 2006; Fasaei, Tempelaar, and Jansen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019). In this 
sense, a firm’s reputation constitutes an interpretative scheme for stakeholders, based on 
which investors evaluate firm behaviors regarding their perceived likelihood of contributing 
to expected outcomes (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Following Haleblian and colleagues (2017), and 
consistent with the view of a firm’s reputation as a reflection of its past actions and outcomes 
(Basdeo et al., 2006), we conceptualize a firm’s reputation as a consistent track record of 
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creating value for a specific group of stakeholders, investors
1
. Although Haleblian and 
colleagues (2017) have defined a firm’s reputation as being known for creating shareholder 
value in general, our conceptualization suggests that firms may be known for a particular way 
of doing so (Mishina et al., 2012; Parker et al., 2019). More specifically, we argue that firms 
may create shareholder value either by delivering better-than-average growth and/or by 
paying dividends (Brealey et al., 2014). By doing so consistently over time, firms develop a 
growth and/or dividend reputation respectively (Aghion and Stein, 2008; Benner, 2007). 
We argue that these distinct types of reputations give rise to varied investor expectations 
regarding the type of strategic activities that a firm should undertake (Parker et al., 2019). For 
instance, once a firm initiates a dividend payment, it implicitly commits to maintaining or 
increasing it in the future, because failure to do so is punished by investors (Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). Since a firm’s ability to pay dividends hinges on its 
profitability, investors evaluate the actions of firms with a dividend reputation based on their 
anticipated impact on future profitability (Benner and Ranganathan, 2013). For such firms, 
therefore, strategic actions that are anticipated to enhance or reduce profits are perceived 
respectively by investors as positive or negative expectancy violations. Conversely, when a 
firm has a growth reputation, investors are particularly sensitive to potential declines in future 
growth prospects (Kim, Haleblian, and Finkelstein, 2011; Pfarrer et al., 2010) and evaluate 
the firm’s actions based on their likely impact on future growth (Benner and Ranganathan, 
2013). Thus, actions that are anticipated to strengthen the firm’s ability to seize new growth 
opportunities are perceived as positive expectancy violations, while those that will curb 
growth are perceived as negative violations. 
                                                     
1
 In their review of research on organizational reputation, Lange and colleagues (2011, p. 155) note that 
management scholars have conceptualized reputation in three different ways: “being known (generalized 
awareness or visibility of the firm; prominence of the firm in the collective perception), being known for 
something (perceived predictability of organizational outcomes and behavior relevant to specific audience 
interests), and generalized favorability (perceptions or judgments of the overall organization as good, attractive, 
and appropriate).” Our conceptualization of reputation corresponds to “being known for something.” 
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Scholars have argued that firms can hold multiple reputations (Parker et al., 2019). 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that firms may pursue strategies that help them develop both 
dividend and growth reputations. For example, in 2016 prominent firms such as 3M, Johnson 
& Johnson, Leggett & Platt, and Sysco not only increased their dividend payouts but also 
generated higher-than-average growth compared to their peers, and explicitly communicated 
their commitment to both increasing dividends and achieving growth. For example, Leggett 
and Platt (2015) stressed in their annual letter to the shareholders that “…we have also been 
achieving better-than-market growth in several lines of business… We increased our annual 
dividend for the 43rd consecutive year, a record we plan to extend.” Building on these 
insights, we next examine separately how investors’ perceptions of acquisitions are shaped by 
the dividend and growth reputations of an acquiring firm.  
Acquirer’s dividend and growth reputation and investors’ reactions to acquisitions 
We expect investors to perceive an acquisition by a firm with a dividend reputation as a 
negative expectancy violation because of two reasons. First, investors expect from firms with 
a dividend reputation to prioritize dividend payments over other strategic initiatives, and to 
refrain from actions that might jeopardize its profitability (Brav et al., 2005). Acquisitions, 
however, absorb firm resources that could otherwise be used to improve short-term 
profitability, for example by improving operational margins. In addition, although 
acquisitions require substantial investments in the short run such as for acquisition premiums 
and integration, any eventual gains usually materialize only in the long run. Thus, if a firm 
diverts its resources away from improving short-term profits, and at the same time makes an 
immediate increase in capital spending, this is likely to cause concerns among its investors 
that the firm might be sacrificing dividend payments in order to prioritize longer-term goals. 
Second, a firm’s dividend reputation prompts investors to prioritize a steady stream of 
dividend payments over potentially higher yet more uncertain gains (Graham and Kumar, 
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2006; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt, 2003). Investors appreciate firms with a 
dividend reputation because they offer the opportunity of increased dividends in the future 
without any threat of dividend cuts (Devers, Wiseman, and Holmes, 2007). Because of their 
risk aversion, these investors expect a firm to focus on improving efficiency without 
increasing its exposure to risky and ambiguous situations. However, potential gains from 
acquisitions in terms of operational synergies are often highly uncertain and fail to 
materialize (Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Cording, Christmann, and King, 2008). As a 
consequence, a firm with a dividend reputation may be perceived by investors as failing to 
meet their value-creation expectations by making an acquisition. We thus argue that investors 
react negatively to an acquisition announcement, as evidenced by lower abnormal stock 
returns, to the extent that an acquirer has a dividend reputation. 
Hypothesis 1a. The strength of the acquirer’s dividend reputation is negatively 
associated with the abnormal stock returns associated with an acquisition 
announcement. 
Conversely, we expect investors to perceive acquisitions as positive expectancy violations 
to the extent that the acquiring firms hold a growth reputation There are at least two reasons 
for this. First, investors of firms with a growth reputation prefer strategies to accelerate 
growth by pioneering new technologies, disrupting current markets or exploring nascent 
areas (Benner, 2007; Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). Acquisitions are widely perceived as 
conduits for rapid growth (Kim et al., 2011; McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes, 2008; 
Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) as they allow firms to expand into new markets or to 
improve their market share in existing markets more rapidly than internal efforts (Lee and 
Lieberman, 2010). Moreover, acquisitions also enable access to new technologies that may 
help an acquirer to accelerate its growth (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Kapoor and Lim, 2007). 
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Therefore, investors of firms with a growth reputation are likely to perceive acquisitions as 
appropriate vehicles that may enable these firms to exceed their future growth expectations.  
Second, a firm with a growth reputation has demonstrated better-than-average capital 
gains in the past and its investors may be willing to take risks to realize similar or even higher 
returns in the future (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Even though investors may understand that an 
acquisition is not without risks and costs (Baik, Farber, and Petroni, 2009; Benner and 
Ranganathan, 2013), they may react to it positively because they consider such bold 
competitive moves to be vital for increasing market power, expanding market share, and 
achieving superior growth rates. Therefore, because acquisitions are seen as conduits for 
accelerating growth, which induce positive sentiments about risky yet aggressive moves to 
create superior shareholder value, we suggest that investors will react more favorably to an 
acquisition made by a firm with a growth reputation. 
Hypothesis 1b. The strength of the acquirer’s growth reputation is positively 
associated with the abnormal stock returns associated with an acquisition 
announcement.  
The role of substantive and symbolic information in shaping perceptions of expectancy 
violations 
EVT suggests that perceived expectancy violations trigger an evaluation process whereby 
decision makers try to make sense of the event causing the violation (Burgoon, 1993). Since 
there is no causal explanation for unexpected events, decision makers seek additional 
information to make sense of such events (Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1981). Given that an 
acquisition may be perceived as a negative or a positive expectation violation, we argue that 
investors rely on additional sources of information that could help them to reinforce or revise 
their initial perceptions of whether the acquisition will enable the firm to fulfill their 
expectations, or prevent it from doing so. 
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Research in management shows that, when evaluating organizational events, stakeholders 
use substantive as well as symbolic information cues (Cuypers et al., 2016; Goffman, 1974; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1998). Substantive information cues refer to information regarding a 
firm’s actions that require the use of firm resources. Since substantive cues constitute 
tangible and observable evidence of how a firm deploys its resources (Fiss and Zajac, 2006), 
they provide insights to stakeholders about the extent to which a firm is able to meet or 
exceed their expectations (Cuypers et al., 2016). Symbolic information cues refer to signals 
that convey how managers intend to fulfill stakeholders’ expectations (Fiss and Zajac, 2004). 
Specifically, symbolic cues refer to a firm’s use of impression management to convey 
information about how its actions are intended to serve stakeholder interests (Fiss and Zajac, 
2004, 2006; Goffman, 1974). While symbolic cues do not constitute tangible evidence and 
may be based on “mere talk,” they reduce the uncertainty regarding the managerial motives 
behind a firm’s actions, and mitigate concerns about the alignment between the interests of 
the firm and those of its stakeholders (Westphal and Zajac, 1998).  
Acquirer’s reputations, target’s reputations, and investors’ reactions to acquisitions 
Because the acquisition of a particular target firm involves the utilization of financial and 
managerial resources to internalize new capabilities, it represents a resource deployment 
choice by the acquiring firm (e.g., Capron and Mitchell, 2009). Thus, the organizational 
capabilities of the target firm, as reflected in its reputation for value creation, may be used by 
investors as substantive information cues to make sense of why the acquirer is engaging in a 
specific acquisition. Such sense-making efforts could enable investors to feel more confident 
in assessing whether the acquirer’s intentions represent a divergence from their expectations. 
For instance, while the acquisition of a target firm with a growth reputation may be 
interpreted as an attempt to enhance future growth, the acquisition of a target firm with a 
dividend reputation may be perceived as a desire to improve cash flows. 
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Although a target firm’s dividend and growth reputations may both be considered 
relevant substantive cues for investors, research in social psychology suggests that when 
seeking new information to make sense of a perceived expectancy violation, people tend to 
prioritize information that supports their initial interpretation of an event i.e, the confirmation 
bias (Nickerson, 1998; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987). Confirmation bias arises because 
people want to avoid negative consequences associated with an erroneous initial evaluation 
(Nickerson, 1998; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987). We therefore argue that when 
investors perceive an acquisition as a negative expectancy violation, they focus selectively on 
information about the target firm’s reputation confirming their initial interpretation that the 
acquirer is failing to meet their expectations. Similarly, when investors perceive an 
acquisition as a positive expectancy violation, they focus selectively on information about the 
target firm’s reputation confirming their initial interpretation that the acquirer is exceeding 
their expectations. We therefore predict that investors will focus exclusively on the target 
firm’s growth reputation when making sense of an acquisition because, depending on the 
acquirer’s reputation, it may serve as confirmatory evidence for their initial evaluation of an 
acquisition as either a negative or a positive expectancy violation. 
We argue that when investors observe that an acquirer with a dividend reputation has 
selected a target with a growth reputation, this amplifies their initial concerns about the 
acquirer’s ability to maintain dividend payments in the future. First, the acquisition of a target 
with a growth reputation implies that the acquiring firm is internalizing new capabilities 
geared towards expanding into new markets or improving market share in existing markets. 
While such strategic moves may improve the acquiring firm’s competitiveness in the long 
term, they are unlikely to increase profitability in the short term. This may lead profit-
maximizing investors to be concerned that the post-acquisition strain on short-term 
profitability is likely to be even greater than initially anticipated. Specifically, investors may 
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perceive that short-term profitability is likely to be compromised not only by the acquisition 
costs but also by the growth-oriented strategic actions that the acquiring firm is likely to take 
following the acquisition. Second, the growth reputation of a target may signal to investors 
that the acquirer intends to shift its strategic priorities from increasing dividend payments to 
accelerating growth. Such a perception will heighten investors’ initial concerns that potential 
post-acquisition earnings will be allocated to more risky endeavors such as entering new 
markets, rather than paying dividends. Consequently we argue that, for investors of an 
acquiring firm with a dividend reputation, a target firm’s growth reputation will intensify 
their initial evaluation that their expectations are being negatively violated. 
Hypothesis 2a: A target firm’s growth reputation will strengthen the negative 
association between the acquirer’s dividend reputation and the abnormal stock 
returns associated with an acquisition announcement. 
Extending our argument that a firm’s growth reputation leads investors to perceive its 
acquisitions as positive expectancy violations, we suggest that investors will focus selectively 
on the growth reputation of the target firm when evaluating an acquisition. That is because a 
substantive information cue of this kind constitutes evidence to confirm investors’ initial 
perceptions that the acquisition is an attempt to exceed their expectations regarding future 
growth. First, the internalization of growth-oriented capabilities, as implied by the growth 
reputation of the target firm, will strengthen investors’ perceptions that the acquirer is 
expanding its growth-oriented capabilities. This, in turn, is likely to be perceived as a signal 
that the firm takes its ambition to accelerate growth seriously. Such signaling reinforces the 
investors’ perceptions that the firm is committed to pursuing value creation through growth. 
Second, although the acquisition of a high-growth target is a riskier strategic move, it also 
promises a higher potential payoff than pursuing growth organically (Kim et al., 2011). The 
acquisition of a high-growth target therefore demonstrates the acquirer’s willingness to 
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embrace high-risk strategies in order to go above and beyond what might be expected by 
investors to deliver shareholder value. This in turn amplifies the positive investor sentiments 
induced by the acquisition and leads to even higher abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 2b: A target firm’s growth reputation will strengthen the positive 
association between the acquirer’s growth reputation and the abnormal stock 
returns associated with an acquisition announcement. 
Acquirer’s reputation, strategic framing, and investors’ reactions to acquisitions 
Strategic framing refers to purposeful use of impression management by firms to shape 
audiences’ interpretations of a situation more favorably by making specific aspects of reality 
more salient (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Giorgi, 2017; Goffman, 1974; Rhee and Fiss, 2014). 
Strategic framing is a sense-giving attempt by managers to explain to investors how the 
acquisition is intended to fulfill stakeholders’ expectations. It thus constitutes an important 
symbolic information cue that investors may use to supplement their sense-making about the 
acquisition. Acquisition announcements are the primary means through which managers 
communicate their views about an acquisition to investors. By making particular aspects of 
an acquisition more salient through framing in the acquisition announcement (Goffman, 
1974), managers may align investors’ sense making more closely with their own view of how 
the acquisition is intended to generate outcomes that exceed the investors’ expectations. 
Although we suggested that investors are susceptible to confirmation bias when 
processing substantive information cues, we argue that this bias has a weaker effect when 
they are processing symbolic information cues. There is less likelihood of confirmation bias 
when people lack confidence in their initial evaluation of a situation (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, 
Lüthgens, and Moscovici, 2000; Yin, Mitra, and Zhang, 2016). Investors usually possess 
more restricted information compared to managers regarding underlying motives of an 
acquisition and its potential to realize synergistic gains (Schijven and Hitt, 2012). This 
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information asymmetry reduces investors’ confidence in evaluating the potential 
consequences of an acquisition for their expectations from the acquiring firm, and motivates 
them to “focus on signals that can serve as a proxy for management’s informed perception of 
the focal acquisition’s synergistic potential” (Schijven and Hitt, 2012 p. 1251). Thus, reduced 
confidence in their own sense making of acquisitions may make investors willing to embrace 
managers’ sense giving regarding the intentions behind the acquisitions and their likely 
consequences, even when these do not confirm investors’ initial interpretations. 
The different expectations of investors from acquirers with a dividend or growth 
reputation makes them sensitive to information in an acquisition announcement that 
highlights particular aspects of the acquisition that are relevant to dividend payments or 
growth. Thus, through framing, acquirers with a dividend reputation may offset investors’ 
concerns that the acquisition will have a negative impact on dividend payments. Similarly, 
acquirers with a growth reputation may reinforce investors’ interpretations of an acquisition 
as a strategic move enabling the firms to exceed their expectations about future growth. 
Dividend framing refers to providing information in an acquisition announcement 
regarding how the acquisition is intended to enhance current and future dividend payments. 
We suggest that the use of dividend framing by acquirers with a dividend reputation can help 
mitigate the extent to which investors perceive an acquisition as a negative expectancy 
violation. Indeed, many acquisitions are made to improve margins through consolidation 
efforts and operational synergies (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1991; Walter and 
Barney, 1990). Others are initiated to reduce risks by diversifying cash flow streams or 
gaining access to capital markets (Rabier, 2017). Highlighting such motives in an acquisition 
announcement may attenuate investors’ concerns that the acquisition will put a strain on 
short-term profitability. Furthermore, providing explicit information about how the 
acquisition is intended to improve or maintain future profitability may reduce investors’ 
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uncertainty regarding the consequences of the acquisition. In sum, we argue that, by using 
dividend framing in an acquisition announcement, an acquiring firm may encourage investors 
to embrace the importance and usefulness of the acquisition, despite its dividend reputation. 
This may then lead investors to revise their initial interpretations that the acquiring firm is 
committing a negative expectancy violation. 
Hypothesis 3a: Dividend framing will weaken the negative association between the 
acquirer’s dividend reputation and the abnormal stock returns associated with an 
acquisition announcement. 
Growth framing refers to providing information in an acquisition announcement 
regarding how the acquisition is intended to accelerate future growth, for example, by 
expanding innovation capabilities, disrupting current markets or exploring new markets 
(Benner, 2007; Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). Although we have suggested that an acquirer’s 
growth reputation will lead investors to evaluate acquisitions favorably, managers could use 
the opportunity to manage investors’ expectations upwards in terms of the growth-creating 
potential of an acquisition. Specifically, managers could present the acquisition as a critical 
and non-substitutable element for their growth aspirations and their vision of rapid expansion. 
Indeed, managers could justify diverting scarce managerial attention away from alternative 
growth opportunities (Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2015) by presenting the acquisition as a 
unique opportunity to take a big leap forward – for example, by establishing first-mover 
advantages, which would not have been possible by other means (Kim et al., 2011). Such 
interpretations of the acquisition cast it in a new and more positive light, presenting it as a 
means to exceed investors’ expectations to an even greater extent. 
Including in the acquisition announcement specific information about the necessary risk 
of making the acquisition could also boost investors' enthusiasm and help them to see the 
acquisition in a different light, as having a strategic intent that may exceed their expectations. 
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For instance, stressing the innovative nature of the target firm and its potential to pioneer new 
markets rapidly could shape investors’ perceptions of the necessity and urgency of engaging 
in a risky acquisition. Such growth ambitions might have been insufficiently appreciated by 
investors without the managers explaining this explicitly by the growth framing in the 
acquisition announcements. Growth framing therefore strengthens the investors’ perceptions 
of the firm’s commitment to pursuing value creation through growth, and this will heighten 
the positive sentiments induced by the acquisition. 
Hypothesis 3b: Growth framing will strengthen the positive association between the 
acquirer’s growth reputation and the abnormal stock returns associated with an 
acquisition announcement. 
METHODS 
Sample and data sources 
We tested our hypotheses using a sample of acquisitions completed by S&P 500 firms 
between 2000 and 2015, all of which involved 100% ownership. We collected data relating to 
deals, acquirers and targets from the SDC Platinum database. We used Compustat to obtain 
industry-related data as well as the financial ratios used to compute the strength of the 
acquirer’s and the target’s dividend and growth reputations. Following earlier research, we 
used Fortune magazine and the Wall Street Journal to gather data on the acquirer’s general 
reputation. We obtained stock price data from the CRSP database to construct our dependent 
variable. We collected acquisition announcements manually from Factiva, LexisNexis and 
the websites of the acquiring firms. Data on investor sentiment was obtained from 
<http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler>. After excluding observations with missing data, our 
final sample consisted of 462 acquisitions announced by 227 unique acquirers. 
Dependent variable 
Abnormal stock returns. We measured our dependent variable using cumulative abnormal 
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returns (CAR) associated with an acquisition announcement and used the standard event 
study methodology (Haleblian et al., 2009). CAR represent unanticipated returns to a stock 
resulting from a certain event – in this case an acquisition. To calculate CAR, we first 
estimated the following asset-pricing model using historical data from a 250-day period 
preceding an acquisition announcement: 
rit = αi + βrmt + εit 
Here rit denoted returns for firm i on day t, rmt denoted corresponding daily returns on the 
CRSP value-weighted index, and εit was distributed i.i.d. We then used the estimates from the 
asset-pricing model to calculate predicted returns over a three-day period around the 
acquisition announcement date (-1, 1), i.e., the ‘event window’. Using a short event window 
mitigated the risk of including confounding events within the event window (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). Next, we calculated abnormal returns within the event window by 
subtracting the predicted returns from the actual returns. Finally, we calculated CAR as the 
sum of abnormal returns within the event window. We also tested our results with alternative 
event windows, e.g., (-2, 2) and (0, 1), and found that they remained largely consistent. 
Explanatory variables 
Dividend and growth reputation of the acquirer and the target firm. We measured the 
strength of the dividend and growth reputations using observable financial indicators. While a 
firm’s reputations such as its dividend and growth reputation represent an intangible asset 
(Parker et al., 2019), they are rooted in investors’ cautious and analytical evaluations of a 
firm’s prior track record and its observable strategic choices (Basdeo et al., 2006; Ravasi, 
Rindova, Etter, and Cornelissen, 2018). That is, a reputation originates from the extrapolation 
of observations from the recent past through which investors develop their perceptions and 
expectations of a firm (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004; Mishina et al., 2012), and managers seek 
to ensure that observable financial indicators remain path-dependent to signal a commitment 
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to a particular means of creating value (Brav et al., 2005). Therefore, past values of financial 
indicators pertaining to value creation through the payment of dividends and achieving 
growth constitute appropriate proxies for a firm’s dividend and growth reputation 
respectively. We measured the strength of an acquirer’s or a target’s dividend reputation by 
their dividends per share (DPS) paid in the year prior to a focal acquisition. DPS has been 
shown to provide the clearest indication to investors about a firm’s commitment to dividend 
payments (Brav et al., 2005). We measured the strength of an acquirer’s or target’s growth 
reputation by their sales growth over three years preceding the year of a focal acquisition. 
Dividend and growth framing. Dividend and growth framing measure the degree to which 
the information released in acquisition announcements pertains to how a focal acquisition is 
intended to enhance dividend payments and future growth, respectively. To measure the 
extent of dividend framing and growth framing used by acquirers, we conducted a 
quantitative content analysis of the acquisition announcements in our sample. Content 
analysis is an appropriate technique for capturing strategic framing targeted at investors (Fiss 
and Zajac, 2006). To measure both types of strategic framing, we first developed dividend 
and growth dictionaries that included specific words that could be interpreted by investors as 
related to ensuring dividend payments or realizing future growth. Our dividend dictionary 
consisted of the words dividend, safe, stable, maintain, cash flow, steady, and all of their 
forms and derivatives. Our growth dictionary consisted of the words grow, expand, innovate, 
rise, pioneer, dynamic, rapid, fast, and all of their forms and derivatives. For example, forms 
and derivatives of the word ‘grow’ that were also included in our growth dictionary were 
“growing”, “growth”, “grows,” etc. Then, we calculated the percentage of “dividend words” 
and “growth words” in each acquisition announcement. Thus: 
Dividend framing = (number of “dividend words” in the acquisition announcement/ 
total number of words in the acquisition announcement) * 100  
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Growth framing = (number of “growth words” in the acquisition announcement/ total 
number of words in the acquisition announcement) * 100  
The illustrative example provided below contains 6.25% dividend framing (= (3 dividend 
words/ 49 total words)*100) and 4.17% growth framing (= (2 growth words/49 total 
words)*100) from our sample:  
“We’re pleased that this all-stock transaction offers NHP shareholders a premium 
and also the opportunity to participate in the combined company’s future prospects 
for dividends and growth… The combined company will enjoy the stability of triple-
net lease assets and higher growth apartment-like cash flows from seniors housing 
operating assets.” – Ventas Inc., 2011. 
To ensure the validity of our two framing variables, we followed previously 
recommended procedures for content analysis when developing our dictionaries (Short, 
Broberg, Cogliser, and Brigham, 2010). First, we identified words commonly used in 
academic and practitioner literature to refer to investors’ expectations about firms with 
growth and dividend reputations (e.g., Aghion and Stein, 2008; Benner, 2007; Benner and 
Ranganathan, 2013; Brealey et al., 2014). We also verified the terms included in the two 
dictionaries with 34 academics specializing in finance, most of whom invested in stocks and 
were very familiar with dividend and growth reputations. Only words that were verified by at 
least 70% of these experts as relating unambiguously and exclusively to ensuring dividend 
payments or firms’ future growth were retained in the final dictionaries (Short et al., 2010). 
To ensure a high reliability for our measure, we undertook computerized text analysis using 
the DICTION software, which produced a word count for our various dividend and growth 
words and a total word count for each announcement. 
To further test the validity of our measures, we trained two PhD candidates to manually 
code a random subsample of 115 acquisition announcements, which represented 
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approximately 25% of our final sample. The coders rated the extent of dividend and growth 
framing in each announcement on a three-point scale, where zero was “no framing,” one was 
“framing was mentioned,” and two was “framing was emphasized” (Uotila, Maula, Keil, and 
Zahra, 2009). The coders were provided with broad definitions for dividend framing and 
growth framing rather than the actual dictionaries in order to prevent manual replication of 
the DICTION-generated word counts used to compute our variables. The inter-rater 
reliability was high; 0.76 for dividend framing and 0.70 for growth framing. The manually 
coded variables had a positive and strong correlation with the framing variables used in this 
study, i.e. 0.55 for the dividend framing measures and 0.67 for the growth framing measures. 
Control variables 
We controlled for a range of factors that might influence our results. Six variables controlled 
for acquirer characteristics. Acquirer size was measured by the logarithm of the number of 
employees. Acquirer cash flow was computed as: “(operating income – taxes - interest 
expense – depreciation - common and preferred stock dividends)/common equity” (Graffin et 
al., 2016: 243). We also controlled for acquirer ROA (return on assets) and acquisition 
experience, measured by the logarithm of the number of acquisitions made by the acquirer in 
the three years preceding a focal acquisition (Campbell et al., 2016). We further controlled 
for two acquirer characteristics which might shape the acquirer’s reputation for specific 
strategic activities, and thus the investors’ expectations of the acquirer; these characteristics 
were acquirers’ engagement in horizontal acquisitions and acquirers’ restructuring efforts 
(Bergh, Johnson, and Dewitt, 2008; Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 2001). We 
measured the first as the logarithm of the number of firms acquired by the acquirer over the 
previous three years that shared the same three-digit SIC code as the acquirer (Capron et al., 
2001). We measured the second as the logarithm of the number of divestitures made by the 
acquirer in the three years preceding a focal acquisition (Bergh et al., 2008). Finally, acquirer 
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value creation reputation was included as a dummy variable, which took the value of one if 
the acquirer was included in Fortune’s Most Admired or the Wall Street Journal and Harris 
Interactive’s corporate reputation rankings, and zero otherwise (Graffin et al., 2016). 
We controlled for eight target firm characteristics that may affect abnormal stock returns 
to acquisitions (Campbell et al., 2016; Graffin et al., 2016). The first two of these are target 
size, measured by the logarithm of the number of employees, and target ROA. Target 
relatedness was the sum of primary relatedness and secondary relatedness. Primary 
relatedness took the value of six, four or two respectively if there was a match between the 
acquirer and target firm in terms of their primary SIC codes based on their four-, three-, and 
two-digit codes. Similarly, secondary relatedness took the value of three, two, or one if any of 
the secondary SIC codes matched based on the four-, three-, and two-digit SIC codes 
(Laamanen, Brauer, and Junna, 2014). Thus, target relatedness took values of between zero 
and nine. Domestic target was coded as one if the target was based in the US, and zero 
otherwise. Private target was coded as one for a private target firm, and zero otherwise. 
High-tech target took the value of one if the target’s three-digit SIC code was 357, 365, 366, 
367, 381, 382, 384, 386, 481, 482, 484, 489, or 737, and zero otherwise (Li et al., 2008). We 
also controlled for the characteristics of the industry in which the target was operating. We 
regressed time on industry sales, based on the three-digit SIC code of a target, for a period of 
five years, with the last year being the year before the acquisition. Target industry dynamism 
was the standard error of the regression coefficient used in the regression, and target industry 
munificence was the regression coefficient itself, both scaled by the average industry sales for 
the five years used in the regression (McNamara et al., 2008). Target industry concentration 
was the combined market share of the four largest competitors in the target firm’s industry. 
We included four deal characteristics in our regression models following prior research, 
namely deal value (logarithmically transformed); premium, which was the percentage 
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difference between the price per share paid by the acquirer for the target firm and the share 
price of the target one week prior to the acquisition announcement; percentage of stock 
payment; and friendly acquisition, coded as one if the acquisition was classified as friendly in 
SDC, and zero otherwise (Campbell et al., 2016). 
We also controlled for two more types of framing that could signal shareholder value 
creation in acquisition announcements. First, we included shareholder value framing, 
measuring the number of references to “shareholder value” (or derived forms) relative to the 
total number of words in the announcement calculated as a percentage (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). 
Second, as the idea of strategic fit could shift investors’ interpretation of the acquisition as 
“good” or “bad” (Campbell et al., 2016), we included strategic fit framing, this being 
measured as a percentage of the number of references to “strategic fit” relative to the total 
number of words in the announcement. 
Lastly, we included the announcement length, measured as the logarithm of the number 
of words used in the announcement, investor sentiment for the month prior to the acquisition 
announcement, which we measured using an index developed and validated by Baker and 
Wurgler (2006), and year dummies to rule out year-specific effects. Several outliers in terms 
of the target firms’ dividend and growth reputations and dividend and growth framing were 
winsorized, but using the original values instead did not change our results. 
Estimation method 
When estimating our models we accounted for possible selection bias, which could affect our 
results for two reasons. First, there may be systemic differences between S&P 500 firms that 
made acquisitions and those that did not. Second, firms with dividend or growth reputations 
may have systemically different tendencies to make acquisitions. To correct for potential 
sample selection bias, we used a Heckman two-stage estimation procedure (Certo, 
Busenbark, Woo, and Semadeni, 2016). We constructed a sample of all S&P 500 companies 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
for the period of our study and identified whether they had made at least one acquisition 
during that period, as recorded in the SDC Platinum database. In the first stage of the 
Heckman procedure, we ran a random-effects probit regression predicting the likelihood of 
an acquisition while controlling for firm and time effects. We used as an exclusion restriction 
the industry acquisition activity in the previous year, measured as the number of acquisitions 
made by firms within a specific three-digit SIC code. Industry acquisition activity was an 
appropriate exclusion restriction for measuring firms’ tendencies to acquire, because firms 
tend to imitate their competitors’ acquisitions, as evidenced by acquisition waves (Haleblian, 
Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006; McNamara et al., 2008). As shown in Appendix Table 1, our 
instrument was positively associated with the likelihood of an acquisition (b = 0.001, p = 
0.000). The weak correlations between the computed Inverse Mills ratio and the two 
variables of interest – namely dividend reputation (r = -0.11) and growth reputation (r = -
0.03) – suggested that our exclusion restriction was of acceptable strength (Certo et al., 
2016). In the second stage, we tested all our hypotheses using OLS regression and included 
the Inverse Mills ratio, which accounts for possible selection bias. We clustered standard 
errors by acquirers to account for multiple occurrences of some acquirers in our sample. 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. Consistent with the 
widespread observation that acquisitions typically elicit lower abnormal stock returns for the 
acquirer, we observed an average negative CAR (-1, 1) of -0.8%. The dividend and growth 
reputations of acquirers (r = -0.22) and those of target firms (r = -0.07) were negatively and 
weakly correlated, which is consistent with our conceptualization that these two reputations 
are distinct from each other but may coexist. Also, acquirers did not always select targets 
with reputations similar to theirs, nor did they attempt to frame acquisitions as being 
consistent with their reputations. Indeed, the correlations between acquirer and target 
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dividend reputations (r = 0.21) as well as between acquirer’s dividend reputation and 
dividend framing (r = 0.26) were relatively weak. The correlations between acquirer’s and 
target’s growth reputations (r = 0.13), and between acquirer’s growth reputation and growth 
framing (r = -0.03) were even weaker. Regarding strategic framing, dividend framing was 
used in 173, growth framing in 406, and neither type of framing in 48 announcements. The 
averages are 0.126 % for dividend framing and 0.697 % for growth framing, suggesting that 
acquirers used growth framing about five times more than dividend framing. 
The regression models predicting CAR (-1, 1) are presented in Table 2. The two 
independent variables and moderators were mean-centered. All the variance inflation factors 
were below 10, suggesting that multicollinearity did not affect our results. The Inverse Mills 
ratio did not have a discernible effect on CAR in any of the models, indicating no evidence of 
potential sample selection bias (Certo et al., 2016). Model 1 included the control and 
moderator variables. Of those, deal value (b = -0.624, p = 0.010), percentage of stock 
payment (b = -0.015, p = 0.065) and investor sentiment (b = 1.801, p = 0.063) predicted 
abnormal stock returns to the acquisition announcement. Neither target reputations (b target 
dividend reputation = 0.452, p = 0.341; b target growth reputation = 0.534, p = 0.213) nor strategic framing 
(b dividend framing = -0.287, p = 0.837; b growth framing = 0.194, p = 0.602) had any material effect on 
CAR by themselves, which is consistent with our theory that the way in which substantive 
and symbolic cues are interpreted by investors depends on the acquirer’s reputation. 
In Model 2 the acquirer’s dividend and growth reputations were added to test Hypotheses 
1a and 1b. Contrary to our predictions, the acquirer’s dividend reputation was positively, not 
negatively, associated with CAR (b = 0.707, p = 0.060). When an acquiring firm’s dividend 
reputation was strengthened by one standard deviation (SD = 0.710), CAR increased by 
0.50%, which represented an increase of more than $240 million in monetary terms, given the 
$48.3 billion average market capitalization of our sample firms. Consistent with our 
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predictions, the acquirer’s growth reputation was positively associated with CAR (b = 1.083, 
p = 0.001). An increase of one standard deviation in the strength of the acquirer’s growth 
reputation (SD = 0.855) resulted in 0.93% increase in CAR, which for the firms in our sample 
represented a boost of almost $450 million on the announcement of an acquisition. Overall, 
we found empirical support for Hypothesis 1b but not for Hypothesis 1a. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here  
------------------------------------------ 
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b we added to Model 3 the interaction terms between 
acquirer’s dividend reputation and target’s growth reputation, and also between acquirer’s 
growth reputation and target’s growth reputation. The coefficient for the interaction term 
between acquirer’s dividend reputation and target’s growth reputation was negative and 
precisely estimated (b = -1.464, p = 0.003). The coefficient for the interaction term between 
acquirer’s growth reputation and target’s growth reputation was indistinguishable from zero 
(b = 0.641, p = 0.249). To illustrate the moderation effect of target’s growth reputation on the 
relationship between acquirer’s dividend reputation and CAR, in Figure 1 we plotted the 
corresponding slopes of acquirer’s dividend reputation (between two SD below and above the 
mean) for strong (2 SD above the mean) and weak (2 SD below the mean) values of the 
target’s growth reputation. 
The plot in Figure 1 provides valuable insights into the relationship between acquirer’s 
dividend reputation and CAR as predicted in Hypothesis 1a. Although the test of this 
hypothesis revealed that on average there was not a negative association between acquirer’s 
dividend reputation and CAR, the plot in Figure 1 indicates such a negative association 
conditional to high levels of target growth reputation. More specifically, the plot shows that 
acquirer’s dividend reputation and CAR were negatively associated, as predicted by 
Hypothesis 1a, when target’s growth reputation was strong, but positively associated when 
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target’s growth reputation was weak. The point of intersection for the two slopes was 0.445 
SD above the mean of the acquirer’s dividend reputation. This means that acquirers with a 
relatively strong dividend reputation (in our sample, acquirers who paid more than 1.05 
dollars DPS) would generate higher stock market returns upon announcing an acquisition if 
they selected a target with a weaker growth reputation. Overall, these findings provide partial 
support for Hypothesis 2a and no support for Hypothesis 2b. 
We added in Model 4 the interaction terms between acquirer’s dividend reputation and 
dividend framing, as well as between acquirer’s growth reputation and growth framing to test 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b. The coefficient for the interaction term between acquirer’s dividend 
reputation and dividend framing was positive and precisely estimated (b = 3.729, p = 0.012), 
as was the coefficient between acquirer’s growth reputation and growth framing (b = 1.142, p 
= 0.015). To illustrate our findings, we plotted the moderating effects in Figures 2 and 3. In 
each figure, we presented the corresponding slopes for acquirers’ growth and dividend 
reputations for high (2 SD above the mean) and low (2 SD below the mean) values of the 
corresponding framing variables.  
The plot in Figure 2 revealed that acquirer’s dividend reputation and CAR were 
negatively associated, as predicted by Hypothesis 1a, when dividend framing was weak, but 
positively associated when dividend framing was strong. This suggests that the negative 
association between an acquirer’s dividend reputation and CAR as predicted in Hypothesis 1a 
is conditional on low levels of dividend framing. The point of intersection between the two 
slopes was 0.882 SD above the mean of acquirers’ dividend reputation. This means that 
acquirers with a relatively strong dividend reputation (in our sample, acquirers who paid 
more than 1.36 dollars DPS) would generate higher abnormal stock returns if they used high 
rather than low levels of dividend framing in their acquisition announcements. These findings 
provided partial support to Hypothesis 3a. 
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The plot in Figure 3 showed a slight negative association between acquirer’s growth 
reputation and CARs when acquirers used low levels of growth framing in acquisition 
announcements, and a strong positive association when they used high levels of growth 
framing. The point of intersection between the two slopes was 0.311 SD below the mean of 
the acquirer’s growth reputation. This means that even acquirers with a relatively weak 
growth reputation (in our sample, acquirers with sales growth of at least 20% over the three 
years preceding a focal acquisition) would generate abnormal stock returns by using high 
rather than low levels of growth framing in their announcements. These findings provided 
support for Hypothesis 3b.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Robustness tests for alternative measurements of dividend and growth framing 
We ran several robustness tests with alternative operationalizations of our dividend and 
growth framing variables. First, we allowed for the possibility that words used in dividend 
and growth framing might carry different weights with investors. The most salient words, 
which were “dividend” for dividend framing and “growth” for growth framing, were given a 
weight of 1. The rest of the words from the dividend and growth dictionaries were given a 
weight of 0.5. Using these weighted framing measures yielded consistent results about the 
interaction effect between acquirer’s reputations and framing (b acquirer dividend reputation x weighted 
dividend framing = 5.226, p = 0.019; b acquirer growth reputation x weighted growth framing = 1.380, p = 0.009). 
Second, we created dividend and growth framing indices, which incorporated the depth and 
breadth of dividend and growth framing. The depth was captured by our original measure. 
The breadth was meant to capture the variety of dividend- and growth-related topics covered 
in each announcement, and was measured as the proportion of words from the dividend and 
growth dictionaries used in each announcement to the total number of words in the dividend 
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and growth dictionaries respectively. The framing breadth and depth measures were 
standardized and added together to create overall growth and dividend framing indexes. 
Using these measures also yielded consistent conclusions about the moderating effect of 
framing on the association between acquirer’s reputation and abnormal stock returns to 
acquisition announcements (b acquirer dividend reputation x dividend framing index = 0.402, p = 0.031; b 
acquirer growth reputation x growth framing index = 0.252, p = 0.044). 
Robustness tests for the exogeneity of dividend and growth framing 
A potential concern for our hypothesis tests was whether our framing variables were 
exogenous. To address this, we used a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression (Semadeni, 
Withers, and Certo, 2014). In the first stage we estimated dividend and growth framing in 
separate regressions, using all control variables and carefully selected instruments. As an 
instrument for dividend framing, we used the percentage of dividend-paying firms within the 
acquirer’s three-digit SIC code that cut their dividends per share in the year preceding the 
acquisition as dividend cuts by industry peers are likely to predict decreases in the use of 
dividend framing (Brav et al., 2005). As an instrument for growth framing, we used the one-
year sales growth rate for firms within the S&P 500 index for the quarter preceding the 
acquisition, because S&P 500 firms pay more attention to each other than to their industry 
peers (Denis, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov, 2003). We reported our results in Appendix 
Table 2. Our instruments for dividend framing (Model 1: b = -0.018, p = 0.047) and growth 
framing (Model 2: b = 2.625, p = 0.006) were strong predictors of the respective framing 
variables, and thus satisfied the selection criteria. In the second stage of our 2SLS regression, 
we predicted CAR using all the control variables, the framing variable of interest, and the 
corresponding framing residual from the first-stage regression. We performed the Durbin–
Wu–Hausman (DWH) test to assess the precision of the coefficient of the first-stage framing 
residuals in the second-stage regression, and to check therefore whether dividend and growth 
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framing were in fact exogenous. If the coefficient for the residuals was indistinguishable 
from zero, the estimates from OLS could be deemed consistent and we should not correct any 
further for endogeneity (Semadeni et al., 2014). We did not find evidence of endogeneity 
regarding dividend (DWH = 1.122, p = 0.263) or growth framing (DWH = -0.699, p = 
0.486), meaning that the results in Table 2 are unbiased and consistent. 
DISCUSSION 
We built a contingency model that distinguishes between an acquirer’s dividend and growth 
reputation to better understand why and under what circumstances investors may react 
positively or negatively to an acquisition announcement. We found that an acquisition 
generates more positive abnormal returns not only when an acquirer has a growth reputation, 
but also when it has a dividend reputation. In addition, we showed that substantive and 
symbolic cues influence the interpretative processes of investors in such a way that investors 
ultimately reinforce or revise their initial opinions about an acquisition by a firm with a 
dividend or a growth reputation. Overall, our findings have important implications for 
research on investors’ reactions to acquisitions and on EVT and impression management. 
Theoretical implications 
First, our work provides important implications for our understanding of investors’ varied 
reactions to acquisitions (Campbell et al., 2016; Schijven and Hitt, 2012). Although earlier 
studies have argued almost exclusively that acquisitions violate the expectations of investors, 
and have therefore suggested that investors typically react negatively to acquisition 
announcements (Graffin et al., 2016), few have examined the underlying reasons why 
investors may react positively to acquisitions, and the circumstances in which they do so 
(Campbell et al., 2016). Moreover, earlier work on investors’ reactions to acquisitions has 
assumed that their perceptions of the value of acquisitions are similar for particular groups of 
firms, such as those with a high reputation (Haleblian et al., 2017). Our framework, however, 
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offers a more nuanced perspective on investors’ expectations and their reactions to 
acquisitions by showing that investors do not universally perceive acquisitions as negative 
expectancy violations because of their ambiguous outcomes (Haleblian et al., 2009). Rather, 
perceived expectancy violations arising from acquisitions may vary because the specific ways 
in which an acquirer has created shareholder value in the past give rise to different 
expectations. More specifically, when firms are known for distinct ways of creating 
shareholder value, this shapes the evaluative processes of investors in such a way that, for 
some acquiring firms, they may not only consider an acquisition to be a superior vehicle for 
generating value over time but may also downplay the potential downside of allocating 
resources to acquisitions. This implies that varied expectations about subsets of firms need to 
be taken into account in order to bring together both negative as well as positive predictions 
of EVT in the context of acquisitions (Campbell et al., 2016). 
While our results show that, on average, firms’ dividend reputation leads to positive 
reactions from investors, rather than to the negative reactions we predicted, we found that the 
positive effect of firms’ growth reputation on investor reactions is much more precisely 
estimated than that of dividend reputation. Our findings also reveal that investors’ reactions 
become negative when the target firm has a growth reputation, and when dividend framing is 
not used strongly in the acquisition announcement. Taken together, these results are 
consistent with our conceptual framework as well as with prior research on reputation. More 
specifically, these findings suggest that, as any type of reputation, dividend reputation leads 
investors to give managers “the benefit of the doubt” (Zavyalova et al., 2016), but only up to 
a certain point. That is, despite the potential negative impact of acquisitions on dividends, 
investors do not perceive all acquisitions of firms with a dividend reputation as a negative 
expectancy violation. Rather, the perception of a negative expectancy violation is contingent 
on the nature of substantive and symbolic information cues that investors process in 
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conjunction with an acquirer’s dividend reputation. Specifically, such perception manifests 
itself when investors observe acquiring firms internalizing new capabilities that they perceive 
to be incompatible with the perpetuation of dividends, as implied by the growth reputation of 
target firms, and when acquirers fail to explain to investors how the acquisition is intended to 
enhance dividends. Overall, these findings support our contention that firms’ growth and 
dividend reputations give rise to different expectations from investors by revealing important 
boundary conditions of EVT. 
Second, by examining how both substantive and symbolic information cues shape the 
evaluative processes underlying investors’ reactions to acquisitions, we contribute to newly 
emerging work on the intersection between EVT and research on impression management 
(Graffin et al., 2016; Rhee and Fiss, 2014). While earlier studies have focused only on how 
firms may offset negative expectancy violations by providing symbolic cues to stakeholders, 
we show that both substantive and symbolic cues influence investors’ perceptions of 
expectancy violations, albeit in different ways. Specifically, while symbolic cues in terms of 
dividend and growth framing influence investors’ interpretations of an acquisition as either a 
positive or a negative expectancy violation, substantive cues regarding a target’s growth 
reputation only affect perceptions of negative expectancy violations. This suggests that 
investors take much less account of substantive cues when interpreting an acquisition as a 
positive expectancy violation – for example, when both the acquiring and the target firm have 
a growth reputation. This implies that, to better understand the boundary conditions of EVT 
in explaining reactions to negative and positive expectancy violations, scholars should 
differentiate between the influence of substantive and symbolic cues. Specifically, insights 
about the role of substantive cues in the context of negative expectancy violations may not be 
readily extendable to situations in which the goal is to explain their influence on 
interpretative processes pertaining to positive expectancy violations. 
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Moreover, most research on strategic framing has been done in contexts that involve 
unambiguously negative events (e.g., Elsbach, 1994; Zavyalova et al., 2012). This exclusive 
focus on negative events has limited our understanding of how framing affects a broader 
range of perceived expectancy violations. By focusing on acquisitions, which can be 
interpreted both positively and negatively, we are able to demonstrate that framing can be 
effectively used not only to attenuate perceptions of negative expectancy violations, but also 
to reinforce perceptions of positive expectancy violations. This suggests that framing could 
be a more powerful impression management tool for mangers than previously indicated. 
Our findings also have implications for broader research on impression management. 
Even though scholars have examined how firm characteristics may encourage the use of 
impression management (Gamache et al., 2019; Graffin et al., 2016), they have not 
considered the implications of such characteristics for the effectiveness of the impression 
management per se. Instead, they have focused on identifying impression management 
techniques and the usage of frames in general (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Pan et al., 2018). Our 
findings, however, show that growth and dividend framing do not have a direct effect on how 
investors evaluate acquisitions, but rather shape the interpretative processes of investors in 
conjunction with the acquirer’s specific reputation for value creation. 
Practical implications 
Our findings have important implications for investors and managers. We found that 
investors evaluated acquisitions differently, depending on the way a company created 
shareholder value – either through dividends (dividend reputation) or through capital gains 
(growth reputation). Investors seemed to favor acquisitions made by acquirers with a growth 
reputation, and rewarded them almost twice as much as acquisitions made by those with a 
dividend reputation, likely due to their past success in generating exponential growth. 
However, past success does not necessarily guarantee that all decisions will bring similar 
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success in the future (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). We therefore urge investors to be aware 
of such biases and to evaluate acquisitions by high-growth firms on their own merits. 
Our findings also underscore the importance of the framing being consistent with the 
acquirer’s dividend or growth reputation. Hence, we encourage firms that are announcing an 
acquisition to provide explicit information to investors regarding how the acquisition is 
intended to create additional value for shareholders, taking into account the current dividend 
and/or growth reputation of their firm. In addition, our findings reveal that investors might 
penalize firms with a dividend reputation when they acquire a target with a growth 
reputation. As such, we urge firms with a dividend reputation to weigh up the potential 
benefits and drawbacks before deciding to acquire a high-growth target.  
Limitations and directions for future research 
Our findings provide valuable opportunities for future research. For instance we have shown 
that looking at firms’ growth and dividend reputations has the potential to enrich our 
understanding of how external audiences interpret firms’ actions. However, firms can have 
multiple reputations, including for being diversified or focused, environmentally friendly, or 
high-technology oriented. Those multiple reputations might lead to fuzziness in the minds of 
audiences as to what might be expected of the firm (Parker et al., 2019). Therefore, a fruitful 
next step would be to study how audiences integrate and prioritize their expectations when 
they evaluate firms’ initiatives.  
Due to the nature of our research question, we focused on the consequences rather than 
the antecedents of framing. Specifically, we were not able to differentiate between framing 
that was used as an impression management technique, and framing that was the product of 
managerial sense-making efforts. Given that research has suggested both of these are possible 
(Kaplan, 2008), a useful venue for future research would be to differentiate between the two, 
and to investigate the implications of this distinction for the effectiveness of framing. We 
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hope our theory and analyses will stimulate further research on how investors form their 
perceptions about acquisitions and on contingencies that shape these perceptions. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
  Variables  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 CAR (-1, 1) -0.008 0.045 1.00 
               2 Acquirer dividend reputation 0.735 0.710 0.04 1.00 
              3 Acquirer growth reputation 0.477 0.855 0.08 -0.22 1.00 
             4 Target dividend reputation 0.216 0.472 -0.03 0.21 -0.02 1.00 
            5 Target growth reputation 0.733 0.528 0.04 -0.02 0.13 -0.07 1.00 
           6 Dividend framing 0.126 0.225 -0.11 0.26 -0.02 0.20 -0.06 1.00 
          7 Growth framing 0.697 0.499 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.15 0.07 1.00 
         8 Acquirer size 3.395 1.342 0.12 0.26 -0.26 -0.06 0.08 -0.08 0.01 1.00 
        9 Acquirer cash flow 0.438 0.783 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 1.00 
       10 Acquirer ROA 0.069 0.062 0.09 -0.10 0.06 -0.11 0.14 -0.13 0.06 -0.02 -0.08 1.00 
      11 Acquisition experience 2.224 1.028 0.13 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.16 -0.20 -0.12 0.55 0.03 -0.01 1.00 
     12 Engagement in horizontal acquisitions 0.865 0.787 0.09 -0.13 0.19 -0.06 0.10 -0.11 -0.08 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.46 1.00 
    13 Acquirer restructuring efforts 1.275 0.990 0.03 0.29 -0.10 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.09 0.57 0.00 -0.10 0.54 0.13 1.00 
   14 Acquirer value-creation reputation 0.106 0.308 0.06 0.16 -0.08 -0.06 0.08 -0.12 0.00 0.44 0.03 0.13 0.36 0.07 0.40 1.00 
  15 Target size 7.043 1.686 -0.07 0.17 -0.07 0.25 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.36 0.00 -0.10 0.09 -0.04 0.15 0.07 1.00 
 16 Target ROA 0.859 0.732 0.05 -0.15 -0.05 -0.15 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.18 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.12 1.00 
17 Target relatedness 5.491 3.237 -0.05 -0.08 0.15 0.14 -0.01 0.10 -0.12 -0.30 0.07 -0.03 -0.19 0.19 -0.17 -0.20 0.02 -0.18 
18 Domestic target 0.920 0.272 -0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.17 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 
19 Private target 0.006 0.080 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.01 
20 High-tech target 0.411 0.493 0.05 -0.16 -0.09 -0.27 0.02 -0.12 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.10 -0.14 0.03 
21 Target industry dynamism 0.021 0.016 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.12 0.04 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.17 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
22 Target industry munificence 0.057 0.059 -0.05 -0.03 0.19 -0.02 0.18 -0.05 -0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.03 -0.02 0.07 
23 Target industry concentration 0.485 0.201 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 0.05 0.23 0.44 
24 Deal value 6.801 1.710 -0.13 0.20 0.04 0.28 0.14 0.27 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.68 -0.21 
25 Premium 0.351 0.347 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.09 -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.08 
26 Percentage of  stock payment 24.082 37.454 -0.24 0.08 0.11 0.22 0.04 0.22 -0.02 -0.14 0.01 -0.22 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.22 -0.23 
27 Friendly acquisition 0.989 0.104 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 0.12 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 
28 Shareholder value framing 0.025 0.073 -0.06 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.14 0.08 
29 Strategic fit framing 0.016 0.060 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
30 Announcement length 6.640 0.583 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.15 -0.10 -0.03 -0.09 -0.17 -0.13 -0.07 -0.02 0.24 0.01 
31 Investor sentiment 0.131 0.766 -0.06 -0.05 0.26 -0.03 0.14 -0.02 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 0.13 0.13 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 
Note: N = 462. Independent and moderator variables are reported before centering.  
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Table 1. (continued) 
  Variables 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
17 Target relatedness 0.10 1.00 
            18 Domestic target -0.02 0.02 1.00 
           19 Private target -0.10 0.00 0.10 1.00 
          20 High-tech target -0.11 0.06 -0.04 -0.24 1.00 
         21 Target industry dynamism 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.20 1.00 
        22 Target industry munificence -0.22 -0.07 -0.05 -0.27 0.22 -0.12 1.00 
       23 Target industry concentration 0.23 0.15 -0.04 -0.15 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 1.00 
      24 Deal value -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 1.00 
     25 Premium 0.19 0.15 -0.02 -0.26 0.08 0.13 -0.15 0.30 -0.16 1.00 
    26 Percentage of stock payment -0.05 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 1.00 
   27 Friendly acquisition -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.09 0.12 0.10 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 1.00 
  28 Shareholder value framing -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.04 1.00 
 29 Strategic fit framing 0.10 0.10 0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.02 1.00 
30 Announcement length 0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.27 -0.02 -0.16 -0.01 0.16 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.19 
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Table 2. OLS regression predicting CAR (-1, 1) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Base model Direct effect of 
acquirer’s reputation 
Moderation effect of 
substantive cues 
Moderation effect of 
symbolic cues 
Full model 
Acquirer dividend reputation X 
Dividend framing 
      3.729 [1.481] 3.500 [1.515] 
Acquirer growth reputation X 
Growth framing 
      1.142 [0.464] 0.907 [0.541] 
Acquirer dividend reputation X 
Target growth reputation 
    -1.464 [0.479]  -1.340 [0.512] 
Acquirer growth reputation X  
Target growth reputation 
    0.641 [0.554]  0.368 [0.617] 
Acquirer dividend reputation   0.707 [0.375] 0.629 [0.377] 0.491 [0.344] 0.438 [0.345] 
Acquirer growth reputation   1.083 [0.336] 1.037 [0.283] 1.042 [0.314] 1.010 [0.282] 
Target dividend reputation 0.452 [0.474] 0.483 [0.455] 0.674 [0.459] 0.444 [0.436] 0.622 [0.434] 
Target growth reputation 0.534 [0.427] 0.371 [0.429] 0.463 [0.407] 0.341 [0.424] 0.397 [0.406] 
Dividend framing -0.287 [1.393] -0.814 [1.381] -0.718 [1.399] -2.334 [1.469] -2.157 [1.471] 
Growth framing 0.194 [0.371] 0.283 [0.375] 0.288 [0.367] 0.304 [0.377] 0.302 [0.369] 
Acquirer size 0.123 [0.281] 0.313 [0.279] 0.421 [0.270] 0.435 [0.280] 0.511 [0.274] 
Acquirer cash flow -0.188 [0.243] -0.102 [0.242] -0.074 [0.231] -0.105 [0.250] -0.074 [0.238] 
Acquirer ROA -0.132 [5.163] 2.151 [5.090] 2.181 [4.968] 1.838 [5.113] 1.686 [4.955] 
Acquisition experience 0.341 [0.295] 0.340 [0.295] 0.312 [0.294] 0.304 [0.295] 0.270 [0.292] 
Engagement in horizontal acquisitions 0.347 [0.290] 0.301 [0.286] 0.388 [0.285] 0.295 [0.281] 0.365 [0.282] 
Acquirer restructuring efforts -0.094 [0.295] -0.101 [0.288] -0.109 [0.281] -0.115 [0.288] -0.122 [0.282] 
Acquirer value-creation reputation 0.017 [0.879] -0.007 [0.921] -0.064 [0.859] 0.143 [0.885] 0.096 [0.836] 
Target size 0.117 [0.217] 0.178 [0.217] 0.146 [0.216] 0.200 [0.218] 0.162 [0.215] 
Target ROA -0.459 [0.323] -0.468 [0.330] -0.562 [0.339] -0.562 [0.331] -0.613 [0.343] 
Target relatedness 0.039 [0.076] 0.054 [0.074] 0.035 [0.073] 0.050 [0.072] 0.035 [0.073] 
Domestic target -0.421 [0.639] -0.408 [0.607] -0.512 [0.608] -0.162 [0.630] -0.308 [0.628] 
Private target 1.107 [0.709] 0.539 [0.657] 0.128 [0.604] 0.838 [0.695] 0.437 [0.634] 
High-tech target -0.597 [0.487] -0.206 [0.506] -0.257 [0.490] -0.463 [0.503] -0.471 [0.484] 
Target industry dynamism -1.599 [16.338] -5.115 [15.442] -7.614 [14.799] -2.659 [14.716] -4.573 [14.215] 
Target industry munificence -0.795 [4.734] -2.382 [4.797] -0.840 [4.877] -1.423 [4.784] -0.424 [4.881] 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Target industry concentration 1.879 [1.398] 2.282 [1.401] 2.874 [1.391] 2.212 [1.351] 2.698 [1.357] 
Deal value -0.624 [0.239] -0.761 [0.234] -0.791 [0.230] -0.769 [0.235] -0.782 [0.232] 
Premium -0.713 [0.561] -0.650 [0.562] -0.695 [0.538] -0.586 [0.560] -0.645 [0.542] 
Percentage of stock payment -0.015 [0.008] -0.014 [0.008] -0.015 [0.008] -0.015 [0.008] -0.016 [0.008] 
Friendly acquisition 0.689 [1.806] 0.183 [1.651] 0.165 [1.692] 0.270 [1.352] 0.278 [1.413] 
Shareholder value framing -3.076 [3.557] -2.360 [3.594] -2.492 [3.538] -1.864 [3.509] -2.003 [3.465] 
Strategic fit framing -0.817 [2.922] -0.783 [3.024] -0.814 [3.224] -0.265 [3.049] -0.325 [3.186] 
Announcement length 0.201 [0.387] 0.214 [0.386] 0.260 [0.363] 0.390 [0.366] 0.379 [0.348] 
Investor sentiment 1.801 [0.964] 2.107 [0.932] 2.294 [0.935] 2.254 [0.938] 2.392 [0.927] 
Inverse Mills ratio -1.952 [2.068] -0.526 [1.915] -0.097 [1.810] -0.436 [1.871] -0.089 [1.802] 
Constant -3.396 [4.081] -4.971 [3.980] -5.794 [3.900] -6.957 [3.660] -7.185 [3.671] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F (p-value) 3.05 (0.00) 4.06 (0.00) 5.84 (0.00) 4.02 (0.00) 5.10 (0.00) 
R-squared 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 
Note: N = 462. Standard errors clustered on the acquirer are given in brackets. The dependent variable CAR (-1, 1) is multiplied by 100. The independent and 
moderator variables are centered. 
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Figure 1. Interaction effect of acquirer’s dividend reputation and target’s growth reputation 
on CAR 
 
Figure 2. Interaction effect of acquirer’s dividend reputation and dividend framing on CAR 
 
Figure 3. Interaction effect of acquirer’s growth reputation and growth framing on CAR 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 1. Heckman first-stage model predicting the likelihood of an acquisition 
 
Variables     
Industry acquisition activity 0.0006 [0.0001] 
Firm dividend reputation 0.0027 [0.0446] 
Firm growth reputation 0.0677 [0.0291] 
Firm size 0.1421 [0.0329] 
Firm cash flow 0.0740 [0.0321] 
Firm ROA 2.2178 [0.3677] 
Firm restructuring efforts 0.0584 [0.0301] 
Firm value-creation reputation -0.0110 [0.1456] 
Investor sentiment 0.5355 [0.1291] 
Constant -1.2018 [0.1433] 
Year dummies Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood -3836.94 
Wald Chi-square (p-value) 139.60 (0.00) 
Note: N = 7071 firm-year observations. n = 614 
number of firms. Standard errors clustered on the firm 
are given in brackets. All predictors are lagged by one 
year. 
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Table 2. First-stage 2SLS models testing for endogeneity of dividend and growth framing 
 
Dependent variable:  Dividend framing Growth framing 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Percentage of dividend-cutting firms in acquirer's industry -0.0184 [0.0092]   
One-year sales growth rate for firms within the S&P 500   2.6253 [0.9374] 
Acquirer dividend reputation 0.0757 [0.0205] -0.0434 [0.0350] 
Acquirer growth reputation 0.0077 [0.0123] -0.0095 [0.0259] 
Target dividend reputation 0.0107 [0.0306] -0.1201 [0.0479] 
Target growth reputation -0.0221 [0.0200] 0.1455 [0.0442] 
Acquirer size -0.0265 [0.0161] -0.0013 [0.0312] 
Acquirer cash flow -0.0182 [0.0102] -0.0475 [0.0344] 
Acquirer ROA -0.2386 [0.2091] -0.3266 [0.5219] 
Acquisition experience -0.0426 [0.0177] -0.0685 [0.0327] 
Engagement in horizontal acquisitions 0.0086 [0.0153] -0.0149 [0.0345] 
Acquirer restructuring efforts 0.0216 [0.0117] -0.0194 [0.0305] 
Acquirer value-creation reputation -0.0552 [0.0299] -0.0188 [0.0784] 
Target size 0.0260 [0.0103] -0.0188 [0.0250] 
Target ROA 0.0086 [0.0149] 0.0399 [0.0384] 
Related target -0.0001 [0.0035] -0.0290 [0.0078] 
Domestic target -0.0175 [0.0355] 0.2205 [0.0690] 
Private target -0.0126 [0.0796] 0.4418 [0.2764] 
High-tech target 0.0347 [0.0262] 0.0157 [0.0550] 
Target industry dynamism 0.0554 [0.7188] 1.1287 [1.6047] 
Target industry munificence -0.1289 [0.1898] 0.0621 [0.4040] 
Target industry concentration 0.0357 [0.0676] -0.1190 [0.1451] 
Deal value 0.0124 [0.0116] 0.0774 [0.0242] 
Premium -0.0177 [0.0241] 0.0042 [0.0706] 
Percentage of stock payment 0.0006 [0.0003] -0.0001 [0.0007] 
Friendly acquisition -0.0939 [0.1865] 0.5302 [0.1045] 
Shareholder value framing 0.3112 [0.1483] 0.3965 [0.2955] 
Strategic fit framing -0.2014 [0.1165] -0.1141 [0.4900] 
Announcement length -0.0026 [0.0220] 0.0225 [0.0405] 
Investor sentiment 0.0396 [0.0347] -0.1231 [0.0902] 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.0169 [0.0835] -0.1437 [0.2019] 
Constant 0.0146 [0.2715] -1.2298 [0.3651] 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.30 0.25 
F-test for excluded instruments (p-value) 3.99 (0.05) 7.84 (0.01) 
DWH endogeneity test (p-value) 1.12 (0.26) -0.70 (0.47) 
Note: N = 462. Standard errors clustered on the acquirer are given in brackets. Variables relating to 
framing and to the acquiring and target firms’ growth and dividend reputations are centered.  
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